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QUARTERLY SECURITY BRIEF  
[July - Sept. 2012]

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A publication of  
INVISIBLE CHILDREN + RESOLVE  
*LRAcristracker.com*

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# Executive Summary

	LRA Attacks	Killings	Abductions	Returnees
Year-To-Date	238	46	405	352
Q2 2012	78	8	109	96
Q3 2012	45	8	90	94
Q2-Q3 % change	-42%	0%	-17%	-2%

The Quarterly Security Brief provides a summary and analysis of the reported activities of the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) from July-September 2012 (Q3 2012). This brief covers LRA activity in Central African Republic (CAR), Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo), South Sudan, and Sudan.

There was a 42% decrease in reported LRA attacks in Q3 2012 compared to Q2 2012 (see chart). This reduction mirrors similar trends in 2010 and 2011, when LRA attack rates dropped after peaking between January and June. This reduction may be related to the wet season rains, during which LRA forces are less mobile.


A majority of attacks in Q3 2012 occurred in Congo, mostly clustered in Haut Uele district west of Garamba National Park in areas where LRA commanders such as Vincent Binansio "Binany" Okumu are believed to be directing small groups of LRA fighters. September 2012 marks a full year of zero reported LRA attacks in South Sudan.

The most severe attack in Q3 2012 occurred between September 1-3 across several communities north of Bangassou, CAR. LRA forces abducted approximately 49 people, including 14 children, and killed 2 civilians during the abduction. All of the remaining abductees either escaped or were released during the following two weeks. Several escapees reported that LRA combatants raped many of the women and girls, including an eight-year-old girl, before releasing them.

Most senior LRA commanders are thought to be operating in eastern and northern CAR, as well as in the disputed Kafia Kingi enclave on the border of Sudan and South Sudan. Ugandan military forces operating in the forest southwest of Djemah, CAR reportedly attacked a group that included Dominic Ongwen on August 24 and September 3rd.

94 people reportedly returned from the LRA during Q3 2012. Of these returnees, 28 reported being abducted for 72 hours or less, and 50 others reported being abducted for less than one month. The LRA reportedly abducted 90 civilians in Q3 2012, a majority of which were adults.

These statistics continue trends seen in 2011 and the first half of 2012 that indicate the LRA is largely abducting adults for short periods of time to porter looted goods, rather than abducting children and young adults to integrate into the LRA's ranks.



Reported LRA Attacks in Congo & CAR [Q1 - Q3 2012]

## Notable Political Context and Developments

### Troops handed over to African Union force

In September 2012, Uganda, South Sudan, and CAR officially handed over troops participating in counter-LRA operations to the African Union's Regional Task Force (RTF). The RTF is tasked with addressing LRA violence, but the troops, particularly those from South Sudan and CAR, continue to face critical shortages of basic mobility and logistics capacity. The division of command-and-command control authority between the RTF and national militaries also remains uncertain. Congo, where the majority of LRA attacks are being perpetrated, has yet to hand over troops to the AU RTF or to allow other RTF troops access to Congolese territory.

### Sudan and South Sudan reach security, cooperation deals



Following talks in September in Addis Abba, Sudan and South Sudan signed a series of security and cooperation agreements aimed at resuming South Sudanese oil exports to Sudan, improving security along their common border; and strengthening the "four freedoms" protocol to encourage cross-border mobility and economic activity.

However, the status of several border areas remains in dispute, including the Kafia Kingi enclave on the border of Sudan's South Darfur State and Western Bahr el-Ghazal State in South Sudan, where LRA forces have had a presence in recent years.

### UNAMID renewal includes language on counter-LRA efforts

In July, the UN Security Council unanimously renewed the United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) for an additional year. The Council included language in UNAMID's new mandate encouraging it to share information about LRA activity with regional UN missions. During the mandate consultations, Sudan publicly denied any LRA presence in its territory and objected to LRA-focused language in the mandate.

# Reported LRA Attacks Against Civilians



## Attacks Summary

July - Sept. 2012


The 45 LRA attacks reported in Q3 2012 marked a 42% reduction from Q2 2012. This trend mirrors a similar reduction in LRA attacks between Q2-Q3 2011 (35% drop) and Q2-Q3 2010 (36% drop).

Of the 6 reported attacks in CAR, 3 were perpetrated in Mbomou prefecture and 3 in Haut-Mbomou prefecture. The abduction of approximately 49 people north of Bangassou in early September may have been perpetrated by the same LRA group that attacked a French uranium mining company and several towns near Bakouma in June 2012. CAR troops have a limited presence in this area, and Ugandan troops are not deployed in any of the towns affected by these two major series of attacks.

37 of the 39 reported LRA attacks in Congo during Q3 2012 occurred in Haut Uele district, including 20 attacks on communities along the Dungu-Duru road. 2 LRA attacks were reported in Bas Uele district. All five attacks by unknown armed groups reported in Q3 2012 occurred in Congo.

## Attacks Perpetrated by LRA vs. Unknown Armed Group

July - Sept. 2012



# Reported Killings and Abductions of Civilians by LRA Forces

150

120

90

60

30

0

no. of  
civilians

Oct

Dec

Feb

Apr

June

Aug

Oct

Dec

Feb

Apr.

June

Aug

2011

2012

reporting period

## Reported Killings & Abductions

Oct. 2010 - Sept. 2012

Killings  
Abductions

**All Countries**  
8 killed / 90 abducted


**Congo**  
1 killed / 28 abducted

**CAR**  
7 killed / 62 abducted

**South Sudan**  
0 killed / 0 abducted

## Gender Breakdown of Abductions

Oct. 2010 - Sept. 2012



\*These numbers do not represent all abducted persons, but only those for whom age and gender information was available.

## Summary of Reported Killings & Abductions of Civilians

July - Sept. 2012


The 8 killings and 90 abductions in Q3 2012 mark the third-lowest rates of reported LRA killings and abductions in the 11 quarters of LRA CrisisTracker data.

Roughly 1 civilian was killed for every 5 LRA attacks (an average of 0.18 civilian fatalities per attack) in Q3 2012. The killing:attack ratio was particularly low in Congo, where only one person was killed during 39 reported attacks. This indicates that LRA forces operating are taking particular care to follow orders issued by senior LRA commanders in 2011 to reduce killings of civilians.

LRA forces abducted roughly 2 civilians per LRA attack in Q3 2012, the highest abduction:attack ratio since Q2 2011. However, this statistic is heavily influenced by the two major abduction incidents in CAR in which 49 and 10 civilians were abducted. Setting those incidents aside, the LRA abducted an average of 0.69 civilians abducted per attack in Q3 2012.


## Age Breakdown of Abductions

Oct. 2011 - Sept. 2012



\*These numbers do not represent all abducted persons, but only those for whom age and gender information was available.

# Reported Returnees and Estimated Net Recruitment



## Summary of Reported Returnees

July - Sept. 2012

94 people returned from the LRA in Q3 2012: 71 in CAR; 20 in Congo; 1 along the CAR/South Sudan border; and 2 in an unconfirmed location.

Of the 94 returnees in Q3 2012:


28 (29%) were reported as short-term abductees, meaning they were abducted for 72 hours or less. This compares to 109 (52%) in Q1 and 40 (37%) in Q2 of 2012.

50 (53%) others returned within one month of being abducted.

At least 4 (4%) spent more than six months in captivity.

4 (4%) were Ugandan, including 3 male combatants. This compares to 6 Ugandan returnees (inc. 4 combatants) in Q2 2012 and 3 Ugandan returnees (inc. 2 combatants) in Q1 2012.

## Reported Returnees by Quarter



## Significant Returnee Incidents

July - Sept. 2012

### Banangui, Haut-Mbomou, CAR

August 24, 2012

Security forces clashed with a group of LRA led by Dominic Ongwen 70km southwest of Djemah (near Banangui) in CAR, and rescued a 6-year-old boy and a 19-year-old man. 2 LRA combatants were killed in the clash, and their weapons and equipment were recovered. Additional returnees from this group have been reported following the clash.

Verification Rating: 5, LRA Actor Verification: High

### Guyanga, Haut-Mbomou, CAR

September 12, 2012

LRA forces released 9 of the 10 civilians abducted on September 12 from Guyanga, CAR. The remaining abductee was reportedly killed by the LRA while in captivity.

Verification Rating: 4, LRA Actor Verification: High

# Data Collection and Verification Process

## 1 Data Collection

Report sourcing:

- HF radio operators in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Central African Republic
  - Civilians report activity to HF radio tower operators
  - Over 30 HF radio operators call the Dungu hub twice daily to report armed group activity
  - Activity is entered into a spreadsheet and then sent to data coders.
- UN and NGO reports
- News and media outlets
- Civil society contacts in local communities
- Government sources
- Field research conducted by Resolve and Invisible Children staff

Sourcing coverage: LRA Crisis Tracker Database team members make every effort to obtain data from all LRA-affected regions. Due to the remote nature of LRA-affected areas, the sourcing infrastructure available to project administrators is uneven across the geographic area of concern, and data included in the Database is often of better quality in areas with higher NGO and news agency traffic. The LRA Crisis Tracker Database does not claim to be a comprehensive record of all LRA or related incidents in the region, but team members make every effort to fill in areas where the data may not be easily accessible.

*Note: The majority of the information gathering systems are located in Congo, leading to a disproportional amount of LRA reports from Congo. In upcoming months both Invisible Children and CRS, funded by USAID, will expand information gathering systems in CAR, hoping to improve access to information in the region.*

## 2 Data Entry

Database entry: Reports are divided between a team of coders from both Invisible Children and Resolve. Coders determine if the source is reliable or unreliable (See section 4.2.B of the Codebook, Determining the Reliability of a Source). Before an incident is reported, the coder reads through other incidents in the same time range and checks for duplicates.

Verification rating: After an incident is categorized, each incident is given a Verification Rating, which rates the team's confidence in the details of the reported data. Each incident is given a rating of "1" through "5," with "1" being the most unreliable and "5" being very reliable. The rating is based on the trustworthiness of the source, confidence in the identity of the actors involved in the incident, and the degree of detail given in the source report. A verification rating of "2" through "5" is considered adequately verified to be reported publicly, and therefore is included in statistics and analysis (Codebook section 4.2A).

LRA Actor Verification rating: To distinguish between LRA and other armed group attacks, the Crisis Tracker Codebook has a list of LRA Indicators and Non-LRA Indicators. If after reviewing the indicators and other available evidence the data coder determines that the perpetrator of an attack was likely the LRA, the incident is given an LRA Actor Verification rating, 'Low,' 'Medium,' or 'High,' to measure the likelihood of the perpetrator being LRA. (Codebook section 4.2C.) If after reviewing an incident the coder determines that the LRA was not the perpetrator and the perpetrator is unknown, Actor 1 is marked as 'Armed Group' and the incident is not mapped.

## 3 Data Review

Initial review: Each report is reviewed by a second data coder to catch human errors and duplicate reports. Coders look for incidents that are alike in details, and have a relatively close time frame and location. These incidents are then investigated to ensure that they are not duplicate reports.

Expert review: IC and Resolve staff with field experience review sensitive incidents immediately and review all incidents every three months. Should this staff member feel an incident was misreported, the incident is corrected and potentially unmapped. External LRA and regional experts are consulted as necessary.

## 4 Data Mapping & Sharing

Data mapping: After an incident is entered and approved to be mapped, it appears on the LRA Crisis Tracker website. Only incidents involving the LRA or persons formerly abducted by the LRA and given a Verification rating of '2' or higher are mapped.

Data sensitivity: Sensitive information such as specific sources, names, information on security forces, and personal information about minors is not shared publicly.

Data sharing: Data is regularly sent to UN agencies and humanitarian practitioners for comparison and collaboration.

## 5 Data Revamp

As the database grows and policies are updated to reflect best practices, data coders revisit and "revamp" the data when needed.

With the establishment of the HF Radio Network and expanded reporting mechanisms in the region, incident reporting has become more detailed and the database has been adapted to reflect this. Fields including information

# Data Collection and Verification Process

on age and gender of victims, and goods looted have been added since the beginning of the database. Coders periodically revisit all incidents and reports to include the new details and fields.

## 6 Data Analysis & Reporting

Crisis Tracker staff analyze data for trends and patterns in LRA activity. For instance, coders look for trends in the age and gender of abducted persons, net recruitment (total abductions- total returnees), and increases in a certain type of attack. Coders also look for new traits and patterns in LRA activity.

Specific areas and provinces are also analyzed for increases or decreases in number and type of attack.

After analysis has been completed and reviewed, it is reported in various Crisis Tracker reports.

## Definitions

### Attack:

An incident is considered an “attack” in the Brief if LRA activity results in one of the following human rights violations: violence resulting in death or injury, sexual or gender based violence, abduction, looting, or displacement. For detailed definitions of these human rights abuses, please refer to section 4.5 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.6.

### Killing:

An incident is regarded as a “killing” if there is a violent act that results in the death of an individual who is not known to be associated with an armed group or security force. Civilian deaths resulting from injuries sustained from an attack are considered a “killing.” Also, if a civilian is killed while in LRA captivity, it is considered a “killing” if it occurs within

one week of the initial abduction. For a detailed explanation of incidents that are categorized as a “killing,” please refer to section 4.5.1 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.6.

### Abduction:

An incident is regarded as an “abduction” if it involves one or more persons taken hostage against their will by the LRA for any period of time, including civilians who are abducted and released or escape in the same day. A short-term abduction is considered any abduction that is 72 hours or less in duration. This does not necessarily mean that abductions that are not short-term are long-term as there may not be a report of the abducted person’s return. For a detailed explanation of incidents categorized as “abductions” or “short-term abductions,” please refer to section 4.5.2 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.6.

### Returnees:

A “returnee” is considered anyone who escapes, is released, is rescued, or defects from LRA captivity. It also includes all LRA members who are captured. For a detailed explanation of data relating to returnees, please refer to section 4.5.2 of the LRA Crisis Tracker Map Methodology and Database Codebook v1.6.



# About

## Resolve

Resolve is a Washington D.C.-based advocacy organization seeking to move U.S. and international political leaders to take the actions needed to see a permanent end to the violence of the Lord's Resistance Army in Central Africa and justice to LRA-affected communities. Learn more at [theResolve.org](http://theResolve.org).

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## Invisible Children

Invisible Children is an international NGO working to assist communities in LRA-affected areas of Central Africa by expanding community-based early warning systems, reaching out to potential LRA defectors and affected communities through FM radio, and rehabilitating formerly-abducted children. Learn more at [invisiblechildren.com](http://invisiblechildren.com).

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## Further Resources

For a real-time, geospatial look at LRA activity, or to download the data found within the Mid-Year Security Brief please visit the LRA Crisis Tracker Map at: [LRACrisisTracker.com](http://LRACrisisTracker.com).

## About the LRA Crisis Tracker

Data reflected in this brief was collected as part of the Invisible Children + Resolve LRA Crisis Tracker, a geospatial database and reporting project which aims to track incidents of violent conflict in areas of Central Africa affected by the Lord's Resistance Army. Through publication of regular reports and open-source sharing of collected data, the LRA Crisis Tracker aims to help overcome the current deficit of relevant and timely information related to the LRA crisis and to support improved policy and humanitarian responses.

In the interest of continually strengthening the LRA Crisis Tracker dataset, Resolve and Invisible Children welcome new sources of current or historical reports of LRA activity. To contribute information to the LRA Crisis Tracker project, please contact Resolve at [LRACrisisTracker@theResolve.org](mailto:LRACrisisTracker@theResolve.org).

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